National and international agricultural research institutes in Africa have made great progress in developing improved varieties of a range of strategically important crops, significantly increasing farmer yield potential, provided farmers can access the seed of these new varieties. However, many publicly-bred varieties, once released, remain “on the shelf” of research stations and never reach farmers at any appreciable scale. This situation affects CGIAR and national research institutes (NARS) alike and is so pervasive it risks undermining the rationale for public crop breeding entirely.  

Clearly this is an issue that requires everyone’s attention.

When drilling down on causes of low uptake of improved varieties, one bottleneck emerges as key:  supply of early generation seed (EGS), including breeder seed and foundation (or basic) seed.  Lack of access to EGS obviously constrains production of certified seed by private seed companies.  

While both CGIAR and national research institutes (NARS) engage in crop breeding, responsibility for EGS supply lies solely with NARS whose operations are often constrained by lack of funds.  Donor contributions to NARS for EGS production can help jump-start the process but are not sustainable in the long run.  Policies and practices allowing private production of EGS have achieved only marginal success. 

In some cases, even if EGS is produced adequately by NARS and sold to seed companies, the income from such sales must be surrendered to the Ministry of Finance, which reduces both the incentive and capacity for EGS production.   There are, however, examples in Africa of NARS with functional EGS supply systems. These are structured in a way that income from EGS sales is retained and managed by the NARS for sustained production of required EGS.  This scenario argues for the reform of seed policies to allow the retention of revenues from EGS sales by NARS.

Establishing equitable sales prices for EGS by NARS is also key to success, along with implementing a royalty feedback mechanism. Two options present themselves here.  First, the EGS may be priced on a cost recovery basis coupled with royalty payments to the NARS on certified seed sales. Royalties are generally set between 5 and 10 % of net sales of certified seed, but a potential problem with this is ensuring honest reporting of sales by seed companies, and timely payment of royalties. This can be an administrative headache for NARS and seed companies alike. 

A second option is where the expected royalty is embedded in the EGS price.  A single, one-off payment is made by the seed company for the EGS, and the NARS no longer needs to follow up on sales or royalties. For the seed company, the challenge then is for the seed company to ensure sufficient production and sales of the certified seed to cover the initial payment.  

Establishing an income stream from EGS sales is a “necessary but insufficient” means of ensuring sustained EGS supply.  There must also be a system whereby seed companies forecast and pre-order their EGS requirements.  Unless a NARS knows how much EGS will be required in future seasons, it cannot carry out EGS production with any certainty.  Likewise, if seed companies fail to provide NARS with their future EGS requirements, their certified seed production capacity will face uncertainties.  Consequently, an EGS pre-ordering system needs to be in place to ensure sustained and progressive certified seed production.

Public research organizations have the mandate to develop and make available improved varieties, but private seed companies are the most efficient means of scaling and distributing certified seed to farmers.  Thus, the interface between NARS and private companies is a pivotal issue that needs to function smoothly to ensure farmers have access to good seed.  The NARS-seed company relationship can truly be a win-win-win scenario if the seed chain from NARS to seed company to farmers is functioning well. 

Across SSG’s experience with EGS supply in many African countries, crops, and seed policy regimes, we have attempted to distill a set of principles for good practice to ensure EGS supply is self-sustaining and responsive to increasing farmer demand.  These include:

• Financial autonomy for the group responsible for EGS supply;
• Fair and equitable (for both NARS and seed companies) pricing of EGS;
• Effective EGS demand forecasting by the NARS; and,
• A strict “division of labor” between EGS and certified seed suppliers which avoids conflict-of-interest among seed actors.

The challenge of ensuring EGS supply within growing African seed sectors looks to be with us for the foreseeable future and invites additional thinking and experimentation by all concerned.  Going forward, SSG aims to dedicate more of its resources toward finding solutions to this complex issue.